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JUSTICE STEVENS AND SECURITIES LAW
Lyman Johnson* & Jason A. Cantone+
INTRODUCTION
Former Supreme Court Justice John Paul Stevens is famous for many
things. A decorated World War II veteran, he is the final Justice to have
served in that war. He is the only Supreme Court Justice appointed by a
President (Gerald Ford) not elected by the American people, and he may
well prove to be the last Justice confirmed by a unanimous Senate vote.'
On the highest bench, where he served longer than any justice except Wil-
liam Douglas and Stephen Field, he was known as much for his 720 dis-
sents as for the 377 opinions he authored for the Court.2 Fierce independ-
ence is the most notable of his personality traits,3 so much so that his 2010
biographers subtitled their work An Independent Life. This "maverick
streak"4 was thought by some to be so pronounced as to impede collegial
consensus building around his views.' Others recall Stevens's important
work in antitrust law, his altered views on the death penalty,6 or his posi-
* Robert 0. Bentley Professor of Law, Washington and Lee University School of Law; Professor
of Law, University of St. Thomas (Minneapolis) School of Law. The Frances Lewis Law Center at
Washington and Lee University and the University of St. Thomas (Minneapolis) provided financial
support for Professor Johnson's work.
+ The views expressed in this article represent those of the authors alone. Dr. Cantone's research
was conducted outside of his employment, based on a data set created before his current employment,
and relied entirely on information available from public sources.
* The authors wish to thank John Jacob for excellent archival assistance, Andrew Christensen for
editing assistance, and Professor Adam Pritchard for sharing his very helpful data on Supreme Court
securities cases. They also thank Michelle Hamer for helping to create the original data base from
which this study draws.
I See generally BILL BARNHART & GENE SCHLICKMAN, JOHN PAUL STEVENS: AN INDEPENDENT
LIFE (2010).
2 See Supreme Court Sluggers: John Paul Stevens, The Numbers (As of October 3, 2010),
GREENBAG.ORG, http://www.greenbag.org/sluggers/sluggers/Stevens201 0/updates/Stevens%20update%
20through%200T2009.jpg (last visited July 10, 2014).
3 See BARNHART & SCHLICKMAN, supra note 1, at 256.
4 See id. at 254.
5 For example, in Bush v. Gore, 531 U.S. 98 (2000), four justices authored separate dissents, with
the senior dissenter, Stevens, unable to obtain a unified dissenting opinion; See BARNHART &
SCHLICKMAN, supra note 1, at 256-60.
6 See generally Nina Totenberg, Justice Stevens: An Open Mind On a Changed Court, NPR (Dec.
19, 2010, 3:50 PM), http://www.npr.org/templates/story/story.php?storyld=130198344; Adam Liptak,
Ex Justice Criticizes Death Penalty, N.Y. Times (Dec. 19, 2013), http://www.nytimes.com/2010/11/28/u
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tions on the many contentious issues addressed by the Court during Ste-
vens's remarkable thirty-four-and-a-half years of service.7 And of course,
his lengthy 2010 dissent in the high profile case of Citizens United v. Fed-
eral Election Committee' and his provocative 2014 book proposing several
constitutional changes have drawn wide attention.9
But one thing Justice Stevens is not renowned for is his role in the se-
curities law jurisprudence of the Supreme Court. Beyond the usual journal
articles that address his views on discrete issues,"° only two short pieces
written in the mid-1990s even take up the former Justice's securities law
views," and they do so quite selectively, without addressing the last half of
his tenure. Strikingly, neither a 440-page law review tribute to Stevens nor
any of his biographies,2 including that written by Stevens himself,3 give
this subject any sustained attention.
This is both odd and an unfortunate neglect of Justice Stevens's legacy
in this area of law. Justice Stevens authored more securities law opinions
than any justice in the history of the Supreme Court. * He surpassed even
Justices Lewis Powell and Harry Blackmun in overall production.5 True to
s/28memo.html. Michael C. Dorf, Becoming Justice Stevens: How and Why Justices Evolve, FindLaw
(Dec. 20,2013,4:10 PM), http://writ.lp.findlaw.com/dorf/20100421.html.
7 Members of the Supreme Court of the United States, Sup. CT. OF THE U.S.,
http://www.supremecourt.gov/about/members.pdf (last visited July 10, 2014); List of Justices of
the Supreme Court by Time in Office, WIKIPEDIA, http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/List of Justices-of the
Supreme Court of the UnitedStates bytime in office (last visited July 10, 2014).
8 558 U.S. 310 (2010) (Stevens, J., concurring and dissenting, in part).
9 JOHN PAUL STEVENS, Six AMENDMENTS: HOW AND WHY WE SHOULD CHANGE THE
CONSTITUTION (2014).
10 See, e.g., Zachary D. Clopton, Bowman Lives: The Extraterritorial Application of U.S. Criminal
Law After Morrison v. National Australia Bank, 67 N.Y.U. ANN. SURV. AM. L. 137, 178-180 (2011);
David L. Franklin, What Kind of Business-Friendly Court? Explaining the Chamber of Commerce's
Success at the Roberts Court, 49 SANTA CLARA L. REV. 1019, 1035 (2009). Numerous articles discuss
various positions of Stevens in particular cases, just as numerous articles do so for each Justice on most
subjects.
I I See generally Douglas M. Branson, Prairie Populist? The Business and Securities Law Opin-
ions of Justice John Paul Stevens, 27 RUTGERS L.J. 605 (1996); Karl S. Okamoto, Desperately Seeking
a Stevens [Who Cares About the Federal Securities Laws], 27 RUTGERS L.J. 627 (1996). Each of these
short articles seeks to distill from, and comment on, a judicial outlook based on a handful of Justice
Stevens's securities opinions up to 1994, sixteen years before Stevens retired. The two pieces do not
address Stevens's enormous overall output in the area.
12 Symposium: The Legacy of Justice Stevens, 106 Nw. U. L. REV. 409-850 (2012); BARNHART &
SCHLICKMAN, supra note 1. A full-text search of these publications was conducted in Google Scholar
and Google Books, respectively.
13 John Paul Stevens, FIVE CHIEFS (2011). The word "securities" does not appear in this book or
in the book described in supra note 1. The methodology described in note 12 was also used here. Jus-
tice Stevens's 2014 book-Six AMENDMENTS: How AND WHY WE SHOULD CHANGE THE
CONSTITUTION-does not address securities law at all.
14 See infra Part 111.
15 id.
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form as a "maverick,"'6 Stevens dissented frequently.7 Yet, unlike other
famed dissenters-such as Douglas, Brennan, and Marshall-when Stevens
dissented in a securities case, he almost always wrote an opinion stating
why. 9 In fact, he wrote more dissenting opinions in the securities area than
any other Justice.2" And even when he agreed with a majority of the Court,
he frequently wrote a separate concurring opinion. Thus, he wrote more
concurring opinions in securities law cases than any other Justice.2' With
his unmistakable record of authoring the most total opinions, the most con-
curring opinions, and the most dissenting opinions, it is puzzling that Ste-
vens's role in securities law has been ignored.
In this Article, we tell the overlooked story of Justice Stevens's im-
portant role in Supreme Court securities law decisions. In Part I, where we
briefly highlight Stevens's career before his 1975 appointment to the Su-
preme Court, we observe that we can identify no evident interest in or con-
nection to federal securities law or the securities industry, making his con-
tributions all the more remarkable. The only foreshadowing of his prolific
opinion-writing on the subject of securities law was his voluminous writing
of opinions, in general, while serving on the Seventh Circuit Court of Ap-
peals. This commitment to authoring opinions stemmed, in turn, from Ste-
vens's unforgettable experience as general counsel to a special commission
that investigated bribery on the Illinois Supreme Court in the late 1960s, as
Part I relates.
Part II describes our data set and methodology. Part III then empiri-
cally assesses Justice Stevens's role in securities law from several quantita-
tive vantage points. These include the sheer volume of his securities opin-
ion production, in relation to other Supreme Court justices, focusing on the
40-year period (1971-2010) encompassing Justice Stevens's years of ser-
vice but also reaching all the way back to the passage of the federal securi-
ties laws in the early 1930s; the parties and issues involved in, and the out-
comes of, his rulings; and the alignment of justices when Stevens wrote his
various types of securities opinions. Part IV examines whether Justice Ste-
vens advanced a discernible judicial philosophy in his securities law opin-
ions, concluding that, eventually, he assuredly did. He was very mindful of
the Court's altered views on the federal securities laws, as initially champi-
oned by Justice Powell but continuing well beyond Powell's tenure, and
Stevens largely disagreed with that shift, believing the Court had not only
16 Seesupra note 4.
17 See infra Part 11.
18 id.
19 Id.
20 Id. Stevens did not dissent only in securities law cases. He dissented across a wide range of
subjects. His 720 dissenting opinions on the Supreme Court far outpace the 486 of the second most
active writer, Justice William Douglas. See supra note 2.
21 See infra Part 111.
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sharply veered course but had repeatedly failed to adhere to Congress' in-
tent, both original and as re-enacted. He wrote not simply to express oppo-
sition, however, but also to preserve what, in his eyes, he saw as fidelity to
legislative intent, his consistent reference point. As we observe in Part IV,
Chief Justice Roberts recently made legislative intent the centerpiece of his
analysis in an important securities case. This then is not inherently a "liber-
al" or "conservative" judicial approach to securities law. Importantly, Ste-
vens's belief in preserving a minority view for future reference reflects the
enduring influence of Justice Rutledge, for whom Stevens clerked, who
wrote a dissent in 1948 that Stevens cited in an opinion he authored for the
Court in 2004. This formative clerkship experience, then, not a career path
or interest in securities law as such, helps explain Justice Stevens' prolific
opinion writing, in securities law and more generally. We close with a brief
Conclusion.
I. JUSTICE STEVENS AND SECURITIES LAW PRIOR TO THE SUPREME
COURT
Justice Stevens's remarkable production of Supreme Court securities
law opinions invites the search for an explanation. As with all biographic
efforts, we turn to his pre-Court days to aid in our quest. Given that Ste-
vens went on the Court at age 55, he had had several decades of a rich pro-
fessional life before assuming the role of Supreme Court justice. As we
examine his life for clues to his prolific securities law jurisprudence, we are
struck by two facts that we briefly touch on in this Part. First, sketching the
outlines of his life in subpart "A" below, we see what might be called, to
paraphrase Sherlock Holmes's famous remark about the dog that did not
bark, the "curious incident" of the securities law jurist who "did nothing" in
that area beforehand.2" That is, the author of more securities law opinions
than any other Supreme Court justice in history displayed no particular
connection to or interest in securities law before going on the bench. His
biography is intriguing for precisely this reason. The key to his inordinate
productivity, it turns out, lies entirely outside the securities area.
Second, Stevens's five-year service on the Seventh Circuit Court of
Appeals offers a different clue to his later writing. There, as described in
subpart "B" below, Stevens wrote a staggering number of opinions. When
he went on the Supreme Court to serve during a dramatic upsurge in that
court's caseload in the securities area,23 it was to be expected that he would
22 ARTHUR CONAN DOYLE, Silver Blaze, in THE MEMOIRS OF SHERLOCK HOLMES 346-47 (1893)
(Doubleday).
23 See Adam C. Pritchard, Justice Lewis F. Powell, Jr. and the Counterrevolution in the Federal
Securities Laws, 52 DUKE L.J. 841, 858 (2002).
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continue to speak his mind-as he did-with or without any prior securities
law experience.
A. No Earlier Evident Interest in Securities Law
Stevens was born in Chicago on April 20, 1920, the youngest of four
boys. He once told an interviewer that he "had a very happy childhood.
24
His family was wealthy and politically conservative. Stevens's grandfather
and great uncle founded the Illinois Life Insurance Company, and his
grandfather and father built the lavish Stevens Hotel (now the Chicago Hil-
ton and Towers), the largest hotel in the world when it opened in 1927.25
The family suffered severe financial and personal misfortune, howev-
er. The downfall of the Stevens dynasty occurred in the depths of the De-
pression, eventually resulting in the loss of the family's hotels, a criminal
conviction (later reversed) of Stevens's father, and his uncle's suicide. De-
spite these family reversals, Stevens attended the University of Chicago26,
where he excelled academically (being admitted to Phi Beta Kappa) and
socially.27 After earning his undergraduate degree, he entered graduate
studies in literature at the same school.28
With U.S. participation in World War II looming, Stevens completed a
Navy correspondence course in cryptography and applied for a commission
on December 6, 1941, an uncanny one day before the attack on Pearl Har-
bor.29 His nearly four years of work as a naval communication traffic ana-
lyst and cryptographer earned him the Bronze Star and the Legion of Mer-
it.
30
Returning to civilian life, Stevens did not resume his studies in litera-
ture, but enrolled in law school at Northwestern University.3' It was in
writing an unsigned comment on antitrust law for Northwestern's flagship
law review that Stevens began a life-long interest in that area. After gradu-
ating first in his law school class, magna cum laude, Stevens began a Su-
preme Court clerkship with Justice Wiley Blount Rutledge, who had an
abiding influence on Stevens' thinking.32 In that 1947-1948 term the Court
heard thirty-six civil rights and civil liberties cases. In Stevens' majority
opinion in the 2004 case, Rasul v. Bush,33 a landmark habeas corpus case
24 Jeffrey Rosen, The Dissenter: Justice John Paul Stevens, N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 23, 2007, at F54.
25 See BARNHART & SCHLICKMAN, supra note I, at 24-26.
26 See id. at 32-33.
27 See id. at 36-37.
28 Id. at 41-42.
29 Id. at 43.
30 ld. at 51.
31 Id. at 52.
32 See id. at 62.
33 542 U.S. 466 (2004).
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involving terrorism detainees at the Guantanamo Bay Naval Station, he
cited Justice Rutledge's 1948 dissent in Ahrens v. Clark,34 although the dis-
sent was not mentioned in any brief for the case. Stevens' thinking about
the enduring power of a well-written dissent could not have been made
clearer.
His clerkship ended, Stevens turned down an offer to teach at Yale
Law School and, instead, he returned to Chicago and began practicing
law.35 He worked under antitrust specialist Edward R. Johnston, and the
two wrote a 1949 law review article on monopoly enforcement, Stevens'
second scholarly writing on the subject of antitrust law.36
In 1951, Stevens returned to Washington to take a position as staff
lawyer to the House Judiciary Committee's Subcommittee on the Study of
Monopoly Power.7 It was through work on Judiciary Chairman Emanuel
Celler's antitrust investigation of major league baseball that Stevens com-
bined his abiding love of that sport-an ardent Cubs fan3 t-with his inter-
ests in antitrust law and the Commerce Clause.39 After his brief stint in
government service, Stevens again returned to Chicago to what seemed
likely to be a career in antitrust law.4°
Stevens's star rose in Illinois political circles in the late 1960s due to
his work on the Greenberg Commission, which investigated alleged impro-
prieties by two Illinois Supreme Court justices, and his work for the Chica-
go Bar Association in its investigation of Judge Julius J. Hoffman following
the Chicago Seven trial. It is here that we find one key to Stevens's later
prolific opinion writing. Serving as general counsel to the Greenberg
Commission that investigated alleged bribery at the Illinois Supreme
Court-which led to the resignation of two justices-Stevens learned that a
third, innocent justice had originally written a dissent from the bribe-
induced decision.41 But this justice had decided not to publish it in the in-
terest of maintaining collegiality. 2 This discovery made an indelible im-
pact on Stevens, who thought the dissent should have been published to
inform the public.43 Decades later, he recalled the incident and explained
34 335 U.S. 188 (1948).
35 See BARNHART & SCHLICKMAN, supra note 1, at 79-80.
36 Seeid. at 81-83.
37 See id. at 89.
38 See Rosen, supra note 24, at F54. When he was twelve years old, Stevens attended Game three
of the 1932 World Series at Wrigley Field and he has the baseball hit by Babe Ruth in his famous
"called shot" homerun.
39 See BARNHART & SCHLICKMAN, supra note 1, at 88-92.
40 Id. at 93.
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why he believes writing dissents is important, saying "I just feel I have an
obligation to expose my views to the public."'
In February 1970, advisers to Senator Charles Percy, a University of
Chicago classmate of Stevens, presented a list of names of those recom-
mended to fill a Seventh Circuit judicial seat vacant since 1968. Though
Stevens initially balked at going on the bench, President Nixon nominated
Stevens to that court in September of 1970, and he was confirmed by the
Senate by a vote of 98-0. While serving on the Seventh Circuit Court of
Appeals, Stevens continued to show the civil liberties sympathies devel-
oped during his clerkship with Justice Rutledge. In summations of his
work, however, commenters most often used such restrained terms as
"moderate," "centrist," "balanced," "generally conservative" and "careful
craftsmanship."45
B. The Seventh Circuit, Prolific Writer of Opinions Generally
Notwithstanding the lack of any obvious prior interest in or connection
to securities law, one hint of his eventual role as a productive writer of se-
curities opinions emerged while Stevens served on the Seventh Circuit
Court of Appeals. During his tenure on that court-from 1970 through
1975-he participated in 542 decisions and authored a remarkable 289
opinions of various sorts.46 Forty-seven of those cases dealt with securities
law. Stevens wrote for the court in fourteen of these, dissented in five, and
concurred in one.47
That inordinate productivity did not falter with Stevens's December
19, 1975 appointment to the Supreme Court. In just his first three terms,
when he might be expected as a young justice to be cautiously feeling his
way, Stevens wrote more opinions than any other justice. He authored an
astonishing thirty-six opinions for the Court, thirty-five concurrences, and
sixty-five dissents in that three year period. It was evident from the start
that Stevens was going to state his views. This was to be expected in the
antitrust area, his specialty in practice.48 However, this productivity also
carried over into the securities law area in both his Court of Appeals opin-
ions and, as will be shown below, his Supreme Court opinions. This all
came about with no obvious earlier personal or professional interest in it.
Stevens's background was thus quite different than that of his colleague
44 Id.
45 See BARNHART & SCHLICKMAN, supra note 1, at 167.
46 See BARNHART & SCHLICKMAN, supra note 1, at 167.
47 Derived from results of Westlaw Classic search: "United States Court of Appeals, Seventh
Circuit" & DA (AFT 1969 & BEF 1976) & Stevens & securities.
48 During his service on the Supreme Court, Justice Stevens wrote 15 majority opinions, 6 concur-
ring opinions, and 14 dissenting opinions in antitrust cases.
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Justice Lewis Powell, who moved onto the bench from a very active securi-
ties and corporate law practice,49 and of Justice William Douglas, whom
Stevens succeeded.°
II. METHODOLOGY
The study's main objective is to analyze Justice Stevens's role in fed-
eral securities cases and to explore how his opinion output and views in this
specific area compare to his colleagues, including Justice Powell. As de-
scribed further below, the database used in this study was created by the
authors to answer a variety of empirical questions about federal securities
cases decided by the U.S. Supreme Court and was previously used in our
exploration of how the addition of female justices to the U.S. Supreme
Court affected securities law decisions.' This part outlines the variables we
explored in our investigation of Justice Stevens's and his colleagues' deci-
sions in securities cases. For the sake of clarity, we invite interested readers
to review our prior work for discussion of the additional variables included
in the database.2
A. The Database
The database includes eighty-six federal securities cases decided by
the Supreme Court between October 1971 and June 2010. This period in-
cludes all securities cases decided by the Supreme Court during Justice
Stevens's (1975-2010) and Justice Powell's (1972-1987) respective ten-
ures.
53
To identify cases that met our restrictions, we first searched the
Westlaw Supreme Court Database for all cases decided by the Supreme
Court between October 1971 and June 2010 that were coded as "Securities
49 The story of Justice Powell's important role in modem securities law has been compellingly
told by Professor Adam Pritchard. See Pritchard, supra note 23. For a study covering eases in securities
law through 1984, see Alfred F. Conard, Securities Regulation in the Burger Court, 56 U. COL. L. REV.
183 (1985).
50 Douglas served on the Securities and Exchange Commission before being elevated to the Su-
preme Court by President Franklin D. Roosevelt in 1939. See Justices, William 0. Douglas, OYEZ,
http://www.oyez.org/justices/william-o douglas (last visited Jan. 10, 2016).
51 Lyman Johnson, Michelle Hamer & Jason A. Cantone, Gender and Securities Law in the Su-
preme Court, 33 WOMEN'S RTS. L. REP. 1, 11-14 (2011). The methodology section described herein is
a focused, light revision of the methodology section in the 2011 article, the first to use the database.
52 See generally id (previous work displays additional variables).
53 The original database sought cases between October 1971 and June 2010 to span a period
beginning before the appointment of the first female justice through the date when the search was run
(June 2010). For the purposes of this empirical examination, no additional cases needed to be added to
this period of time.
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Regulation" or included the Securities Act of 1933 (Securities Act), the
Securities Exchange Act of 1934 (Exchange Act), or the Investment Com-
pany Act of 1940 in the case headnotes. We then searched the U.S. Su-
preme Court Database for all cases decided by the Court between October
1971 and June 2010 that were coded as "Securities Regulation." In this
second search, we also reviewed other cases coded as "Economic Activity"
cases to confirm the identification of all securities cases. We removed three
cases because they did not involve securities law issues. Later, we received
the benefit of gaining access to Professor Adam Pritchard's database of all
Supreme Court securities decisions, against which we verified the accuracy
of our database.
B. Study Design
As described in our earlier work, we devoted several months to creat-
ing, testing, and refining the coding scheme and codebook for the cases.54
The original database included twenty primary variables for analysis, with
multiple sub-variables to explore the role of justice gender in securities
cases before the Supreme Court. The variables described the parties, histo-
ry of the case, legal issues presented, the holding (what, for whom, and
whether sanctions were involved), and the votes of the justices including
whether any dissents or concurring opinions were written and, if so, by
whom and joined by whom. For this study of Stevens, we created a new
database, removing variables focused on gender and aspects not explored in
the prior study, and used the original data to create new variables related to
the justices in this study (e.g., whether Justice Stevens authored an opinion
in the case).
Before starting the initial study, we performed rigorous inter-rater reli-
ability checks between the five coders and did not stop multiple iterations
of this process until we achieved at least 90% agreement on the coding of
each variable (with almost all variables reaching an agreement of 100%).
During the coding period, each coder worked independently on a subset of
the cases. After brief cleaning of the data, we finalized the database.
In the time between the initial study and the current one, a new, inde-
pendent coder examined each of the cases, searching for any errors. The
authors resolved all identified discrepancies with the original database and
the new coder's work. This inspection to the coding resulted in the removal
of two cases that did not meet the subject matter requirements for this
study. Thus, this study of Stevens's opinions examines eighty-six cases.
There were also minor corrections and the addition of a new category for
opinions that were partial concurrences and partial dissents.
54 See Johnson et al., supra note 51, at appendix A (for a description of each variable and sub-
variable and available from authors upon request).
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The following section includes our analyses of majority opinions, dis-
senting opinions, and concurring opinions authored or joined by Justice
Stevens. We also compare his opinion production to certain of his fellow
justices, and we examine whether there were any notable differences in the
parties, legal issues presented, or outcomes in cases where Justice Stevens
authored or joined the majority opinion, dissent, or a concurrence. The
analyses provided below offer only a partial look at the possible uses of the
rich database.5 We anticipate future articles further exploring the data to
better understand the ongoing evolution of federal securities law jurispru-
dence, the role of particular justices, and individual case factors such as the
parties involved and the legal issues presented.
III. A NUMERICAL ANALYSIS OF JUSTICE STEVENS'S SECURITIES
OPINIONS
A. The Numbers
During his tenure from 1975 to 2010, Justice Stevens wrote more se-
curities law opinions-twenty-nine-than any other Justice in our 1971-
2010 data set. In fact, he wrote more securities opinions than any justice in
the entire history of the Supreme Court.6 Given that Stevens participated
in sixty-five securities cases, his twenty-nine opinions means he wrote in
almost 45% of those cases. His extensive involvement in this type of case
was approximately that of other long-serving justices such as Blackmun,
White, Rehnquist, Marshall, and Brennan, who participated in, respectively,
sixty-nine, sixty-six, sixty-six, sixty-six, and sixty-two securities law cases.
Yet Stevens authored far more opinions than any of these justices. His out-
put of twenty-nine opinions was significantly more than the twenty penned
by Blackmun, and far surpassed the seventeen opinions of Justice Powell,
the fourteen written by Brennan, the twelve by Marshall, the eleven au-
thored by White, and the mere six of long-serving Justice, later Chief Jus-
tice, Rehnquist. Rehnquist, even as Chief Justice, took little interest in writ-
ing securities opinions even though, very early in his tenure, he authored
the landmark decision in Blue Chip Stamps v. Manor Drug Stores.7
The breakdown of Stevens's opinions shows that he wrote seven ma-
jority opinions, eight concurrences, and fourteen dissenting opinions (in-
cluding eleven dissents in whole and three opinions in which he dissented
in part). With respect to majority opinions, he trailed only the reform-
55 For a general overview of cases, see our earlier work. Johnson, et al., supra note 51.
56 This number includes majority opinions, dissents, concurring opinions, and opinions concurring
in part and dissenting in part.
57 421 U.S. 723, 725-55 (1975). As noted in Part IV, infra, although Stevens did not participate in
the Blue Chip Stamps ease, he thought it was wrongly decided.
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minded Powell," who authored thirteen, and Marshall who wrote eight.
Stevens wrote more majority opinions than Blackmun, who wrote six, and
more than the five written by Justices White and Brennan and the four writ-
ten by Rehnquist. Stevens's eight concurring opinions led all other justices,
with even Powell trailing behind. Blackmun wrote seven concurrences,
Brennan and Powell each wrote three, White wrote only one, and neither
Marshall nor Rehnquist wrote any. Taking his majority and concurring
opinions together, Stevens wrote an opinion on the prevailing side fifteen
times, more often than any justice except Powell's sixteen such opinions.
It is with respect to dissenting opinions, however, that Stevens stands
so stunningly apart. To begin with, Stevens dissented, in whole or in part,
in seventeen of the sixty-five securities law cases he participated in. Only
Brennan dissented in more, at twenty-one.9 Marshall dissented in fourteen
decisions, and Blackmun in twelve. Justice Douglas, whom Stevens suc-
ceeded on the bench in 1975, served only during the first four of the years
in our forty-year data set, but he dissented in a remarkable eleven cases in
that brief period, even though, prior to 1971 and quite surprisingly, he dis-
sented only once in a securities case in over thirty-five years of service to
that date. And, strikingly, six of the seven dissenting opinions authored by
Douglas were also in that brief four-year period. The relatively small secu-
rities opinion production by Justice Douglas seems astonishing given that
he was an expert in securities law and the longest serving justice of all
time.60 Still, it should be recalled that, prior to the decade of the 1970s, the
Supreme Court decided relatively few securities cases,6 a pattern it reverted
to in the 1990s." With specific respect to dissenting opinions, Stevens
clearly continued that maverick, if late-appearing, attribute of his predeces-
sor, Justice Douglas.
But Stevens did not simply dissent, though he has been termed the
"Court's leading dissenter."63 He wrote-and far more than other justices,
even as the number of dissenting opinions issued by the Supreme Court
58 See Pritchard, supra note 23.
59 Justice Brennan was appointed to the Supreme Court on October 15, 1956 and he served until
July 20, 1990.
60 See supra note 50 ("William 0. Douglas holds the record for the longest continuous service on
the nation's most powerful Court: 36 years and 7 months."). Professors Adam Pritchard and Robert
Thompson have noted that, notwithstanding Justice Douglas' many recusals due to his SEC service, he
"was not an active participant in securities cases,... [and] most of his opinions show up in the last four
years of his tenure,..." Adam Pritchard & Robert Thompson, Securities Law and the New Deal Justic-
es, 95 VA. L. REV. 841, 917-919 (2009). They conclude that Justice Douglas "had little impact on the
Court's securities jurisprudence for his entire career." Id. at 919.
61 See Pritchard, supra note 23, at 864. We thank Professor Adam Pritchard for making this point,
a point confirmed by his data on all Supreme Court securities decisions.
62 id.
63 Ward Famsworth, Realism, Pragmatism, and John Paul Stevens, in REHNQUIST JUSTICE:
UNDERSTANDING THE COURT DYNAMIC 157, 157 (Earl M. Maltz ed. 2003).
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dramatically rose during the last half of the twentieth century.4 As noted
earlier,65 Stevens wrote because h believed he had a duty to tell the public
what he believed in deciding a case. In fact, he wrote an opinion in four-
teen of the seventeen cases in which he dissented, a remarkable 82%. By
way of contrast, Brennan, although dissenting in twenty-one cases, wrote
only six dissenting opinions (27%), while Blackmun, who dissented in
twelve cases, wrote seven dissenting opinions (58%), and White wrote five
dissents and Marshall wrote four. Powell wrote only one dissenting opin-
ion. Here too, Stevens continued Douglas's later tradition of not simply
dissenting but stating why he did so.66 During this transformative era in
Supreme Court securities jurisprudence, Stevens, perhaps recalling Justice
Rutledge's dissents from his clerkship days, almost invariably stated why
he disagreed with the Court's direction.67
Of Stevens's fourteen dissenting opinions, eleven were dissents in
whole, while three were dissents in part. Whenever he dissented in part,
another Justice joined him. The sole justice joining him differed in each of
the partial dissents; there was no uniform coalition. In ten of his eleven
dissents in whole, he authored the only dissent and was joined by at least
one justice in five of those opinions. Thus, in eight of the fourteen dissent-
ing opinions, he wrote for others as well, while in six he spoke only for
himself.
We note one other aspect of Stevens's remarkable securities law out-
put, to provide greater perspective. The latter two decades of his Supreme
Court tenure (1990-2010) corresponded with a dramatic decline in the
number of securities cases decided by the Supreme Court. From 1971 to
1979, the Court decided thirty-six such cases, and from 1980 to 1989, it
decided twenty-four cases. However, from 1990 to 1999, that number
plummeted to twelve, and from 2000 to 2010, it was a mere fourteen.
Moreover, startlingly, no securities decisions at all were handed down in
the three-year stretch of 1998, 1999, and 2000, or in 2003. Professor Adam
Pritchard has rightly observed that the caseload in the 1970s and 1980s was
an upsurge from past practice and was largely attributable to the presence
and influence of Justice Powell,6" a former securities lawyer. After 1987,
when Powell retired, there were far fewer securities cases for any justice to
write in. Consequently, Stevens's production of twenty-nine opinions is, in
that light, all the more remarkable. Notably, he wrote fourteen opinions-
64 LEE EPSTEIN, JEFFREY A. SEGAL, HAROLD J. SPAETH & THOMAS G. WALKER, THE SUPREME
COURT COMPENDIUM: DATA, DECISIONS, AND DEVELOPMENTS 250-55 (Lee Epstein et. al. trans. CQ
Press 5'h ed. 2012).
65 Rosen, supra note 24, at F55.
66 See supra notes 59-61 and accompanying text.
67 See supra notes 32-34 and accompanying text. We elaborate on Stevens' views in infra Part
IV.
68 Pritchard, supra note 23, at 920.
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more than half of the twenty-six cases decided during the two decades end-
ing in 2010. And showing an unflagging interest and energy, just as he
wrote a securities opinion in his very first year on the Supreme Court
(1976), he wrote two in his final year (20 10).69
B. The Outcomes
We here highlight-from a quantitative vantage point°---certain strik-
ing features of the securities opinions in which Justice Stevens wrote or
participated. Specifically, we identify noteworthy aspects of his involve-
ment based on the areas of legal issue, parties involved, the holding, and
alignment of the justices. To provide helpful context, we report our find-
ings on these areas for both the sixty-five securities cases in which Justice
Stevens participated and the eighty-six securities cases during the forty-year
period of 1971-2010, recalling that Stevens served from 1975-2010.
1. Legal Issue
Overall, the Securities Exchange Act of 1934 (Exchange Act) was at
issue in 73% of all eighty-six securities cases decided over the 1971-2010
period. For our analysis, we differentiated cases where the Exchange Act
was the only issue presented from cases where the Exchange Act was one
of at least two issues presented. More than 53% of the securities cases in
that period involved only the Exchange Act. In contrast, only 6% of the
cases involved only the Securities Act of 1933 (Securities Act). An addi-
tional 13% of cases involved both the Exchange Act and the Securities Act.
Combined, cases involving only the Exchange Act and cases involving both
the Exchange Act and Securities Act comprised about wo-thirds of the
securities cases decided from 1971 to 2010.
Of the sixty-five securities cases in which Stevens took part, the Ex-
change Act was at issue in 71% of the cases. While this number is a bit
lower than in the overall 1971-2010 period, the Exchange Act was at issue
in 86% of the fourteen dissents that Stevens authored, including in all three
of the cases where he authored an opinion concurring in part and dissenting
in part. When that statute was involved during his tenure and he disagreed
with the Court, Stevens almost always wrote.
69 Merck & Co. v. Reynolds, 559 U.S. 633, 655 (2010) (Stevens, J., concurring); Morrison v.
National Australia Bank Ltd., 561 U.S. 247, 274 (2010) (Stevens, J., concurring); Radzanower v.
Touche Ross & Co., 426 U.S. 148, 158 (1976) (Stevens, J., dissenting). In Morrison, although Stevens
concurred in the result, he stated that he "dissents" yet again from the Court's "continuing campaign to
render the private cause of action under § 10(b) toothless." 561 U.S. at 286.
70 Part IV infra provides a more qualitative assessment of Justice Stevens' views in the securities
opinions he authored.
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2. Parties
The government was the lead Petitioner in 14% of all cases over the
forty-year period and in 11 % of cases when Stevens took part in the deci-
sion. This increased slightly to almost 16% of the cases when Stevens was
in the majority, but not the majority opinion author. However, when Ste-
vens wrote the majority opinion, the government was the lead Petitioner in
29% of the cases, about two and half times the frequency of the govern-
ment's position in that role in cases in which Stevens took part in the deci-
sion. Interestingly, in every case when the government was the lead Peti-
tioner during the forty-year period, Stevens either wrote the majority opin-
ion, was in the majority but not the author, or took no part in the decision.
Stevens never wrote or took part in a dissent or concurrence in a securities
case when the government was the lead Petitioner. Although an institution-
al investor was the lead Petitioner in only 3% of the total cases from 1971-
2010 (5% of the Stevens sample), it is of note that Stevens wrote a dissent
or partial dissent in each of these three cases.
Similarly, when Stevens authored the majority opinion, the govern-
ment was the lead Respondent in 29% of those cases, more than double the
rate in which the government was the lead Respondent in the Stevens cases
(14%) or in the total forty-year case sample (13%). By contrast, in none of
his fourteen dissenting opinions was the government the lead Respondent
(or Petitioner). In short, when Stevens wrote for the Court, the government
was far more likely to be a party than when he did not write, whereas when
he wrote a dissenting opinion the government was never the lead Petitioner
or Respondent.
3. Holdings
100% of the Stevens-authored majority opinions held for the Petitioner
even though, across the total case sample and the Stevens sample, the Court
held for the Petitioner in 60% of the cases. This compares to the finding
that the Court held for the Petitioner in 53% of the cases when Stevens was
in the majority (but did not author the majority opinion). Of the seven cas-
es where Stevens wrote the majority opinion, the Court reversed in four
cases, reversed and remanded in two cases, and vacated and remanded in
one case. The Court affirmed the lower court's opinion (in full or in part)
in none of the cases with a Stevens-authored majority opinion. This is de-
spite the finding that affirming the lower court was the most common out-
come (in 32% of the total cases and in 29% of the Stevens cases), with the
Court affirming in part in an additional 5% of each case sample.
When Stevens wrote a dissent, however, the Court held for the Peti-
tioner in only half of the cases-much closer to the rate of 53% in the cases
where Stevens took part in the decision. When Stevens wrote a full dissent-
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ing opinion, the Court found for the Petitioner 45% of the time (and for the
Respondent 55% of the time); when Stevens wrote a dissent in part, the
Court found for the Petitioner 67% of the time (and for the Respondent
33% of the time). Both numbers are notably lower than the 100% rate of
holding for the Petitioner in cases where Stevens wrote the majority opin-
ion. In short, Stevens only wrote the majority opinion when the Court
found for the Petitioner, but he wrote a dissent more in line with the overall
holding average across the forty-year time span and across the cases where
Stevens took part in the decision.
As to imposing sanctions, overall the Court declined to impose sanc-
tions in 44% of all cases over the forty-year period (37% of the Stevens
cases), and left open the possibility of sanctions in only 34% of all cases
over that period (42% of the Stevens cases).7' When Stevens was in the
majority, however, the Court declined to impose sanctions in only 28% of
the cases and the possibility of sanctions rises to 49% of the cases. Even
more striking, when Stevens authors the majority opinion, the Court's de-
clining to impose sanctions remains stable at 29%, but the possibility of
sanctions rises to 57%. Looking to the cases in which Stevens took part in
the decision, Stevens either was in the majority or wrote a concurrence for
all six opinions where the Court imposed sanctions (monetary or nonmone-
tary).
When Stevens wrote the dissent, the Court declined to impose sanc-
tions in 64% of those cases, leaving open the possibility of sanctions in
27% of the cases (and not discussing sanctions in 9% of the cases). How-
ever, while it might appear that Stevens generally dissented when the Court
declined to impose sanctions, it is important to examine the cases as a
whole. Across the Stevens cases, Stevens authored the majority opinion in
8%, the dissent in 33%, and a concurrence in 17% of the cases when the
Court declined to impose sanctions. However, Stevens joined or wrote a
majority opinion or concurrence in 67% of the cases where the Court de-
clined to impose sanctions. Thus, it is not that Stevens dissented whenever
the Court declined to impose sanctions, although he did do so in 33% of
those decisions. When he did dissent, however, he wrote the dissenting
opinion every time. Thus, Stevens appears to have preferred a sanctions
outcome for securities law wrongdoing when he was in the majority, and
when the Court declined to impose sanctions and he dissented, he was the
one to write the dissenting opinion.
When we examine both sanctions decisions and whether the parties
were corporations or individuals, Stevens's dissents paint an interesting
picture. Overall, the Court was more likely to decline to impose sanctions
on a Respondent corporation (60%) than it was in general (44%) or when
the Respondent was an individual (35%). Stevens dissented in five of the
71 In addition, the Court imposed monetary sanctions in only 5% of the cases; imposed other non-
monetary sanctions in 4% of the cases and did not discuss sanctions in 14% of the cases.
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eighteen cases when the Court declined to impose sanctions against a cor-
porate Respondent. He wrote the dissent in all five of these cases.
In contrast, in the thirteen cases where the Court declined to impose
sanctions on an individual Respondent, Stevens dissented only once-and
he wrote the dissent in that case. Also, he dissented in four cases where the
Court left open the possibility of sanctions against an individual Respond-
ent, writing the dissent in three of these cases. This suggests that Stevens
may have been more favorable toward sanctioning corporate Respondents
than individual Respondents, compared to his colleagues on the Court.
4. The Alignment of Justices
Table 1 below isolates the number of Justices (ranging from four to
nine) in the majority for all securities opinions in the entire forty-year peri-
od and displays where Stevens votes and where he writes, in that context.
Not all categories are separated (e.g., the one case when Justice Ste-
vens is in the concurrence, but did not author the concurrence is included in
the "Stevens in majority" column) and others are double counted (e.g.,
"Stevens majority author" is a sub-set of "Stevens in majority"). Thus, the
columns do not add up to the overall number of cases examined.
Number Number of cases (% of cases in the named sample)
of Overall Stevens Stevens in Stevens Full Stevens Stevens Stevens
Justices sample sample majority in author majority concur dissent
in the 72 dissent Sample author author Author
73
Majority 73
4 1 (1%) - - - - - -
5 14 10 3 (8%) 6 (35%) 6(21%) 1(14%) 1(13%) 4(29%)
(16%) (15%)
6 23 14 9(23%) 3(18%) 7(24%) 3(43%) 2(25%) 2(14%)
(27%) (22%)
7 10 9(14%) 6(15%) 2(12%) 3(10%) - 1(13%) 2(14%)(12%)
8 22 17 9(23%) 5 (29%) 9(31%) 1(14%) 2(25%) 5(36%)
(26%) (26%)
9 16 15 13 (33%) 1 (7%)
73 4(14%) 2(29%) 2(25%) 1 (7%)
y 3
(19%) (23%)
Total 86 65 40 17 29 7 8 14
Table 1. Number of Justices in the Majority in the Sample Cases (by
Case Set)
72'73
The alignment of judges in the Stevens sample does not significantly
differ from the alignment across the forty-year period. However, the Court
72 The majority category includes the one case where Justice Stevens joined the concurrence, but
not the eight cases where Justice Stevens authored the concurrence or the three cases where Justice
Stevens concurs in part and dissents in part.
73 The dissent categories include cases where Justice Stevens dissents in part.
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was almost five times more likely to be unanimous (and more than four
times less likely to be split 5-4) if Stevens was in the majority, indicating
that he was a key to achieving that outcome. As shown in Table 1, the
Court was unanimous in 33% of the opinions with Stevens in the majority,
but unanimous in only 7% of the cases with Stevens in (partial) dissent.
When Stevens authored the majority opinion, unanimity existed in only two
of the seven opinions, suggesting he was frequently at odds with one or
more justices even when he wrote for the majority. His dissenting opinions
reveal a mix of speaking for others more than may commonly be appreciat-
ed while also, true to reputation, revealing a go-it-alone streak. This is seen
in all three partial dissents he authored, where another Justice joined him.
In the eleven dissents in whole he authored, he alone wrote a dissenting
opinion in ten of those cases, but other justices joined him in five of those
opinions. Thus, in eight of his fourteen dissenting opinions, he wrote for
others as well, while in six opinions he spoke only for himself. More so
than any other Justice during this period, he was willing to write a dissent,
even if no other Justice would join him.
IV. DID JUSTICE STEVENS HAVE A DISCERNIBLE PHILOSOPHY IN
SECURITIES CASES?
The above quantitative analysis of Stevens's securities law opinions
provides an instructive "big picture" perspective on his work in this area.
But, only by examining Stevens's opinions themselves can we more clearly
understand why he reached the outcomes he did and how he saw the Court's
lawmaking role in the securities law area, particularly given the dramatic
changes that took place during his tenure on the Court. We also believe
that examining a justice's actual opinions in an area can provide more nu-
ance and help paint a fuller picture of judicial philosophy than relying sole-
ly on various numerical "scores" of justices. For example, a recent study
observes that certain conservative justices, such as Justices Powell,
Rehnquist, Roberts, and Alito, are "pro-business" as measured against their
overall Segal-Cover score, whereas Stevens i slightly liberal by that meas-
ure.74 But, using that same measure, well-known liberal Justices Marshall
and Brennan also are fairly pro-business,75 even though they frequently
dissented from the Court's securities decisions. And measured by a jus-
tice's votes in business law cases as against his average Martin-Quinn
score, all of the just-named justices-Powell, Rehnquist, Roberts, Alito,
Stevens, Marshall, and Brennan-are, to varying degrees, pro-business.76
74 See Johannes W. Fedderke & Marco Ventoruzzo, Do Conservative Justices Favor Wall Street?
Ideology And The Supreme Court's Securities Regulation Decisions, 67 FLA. L. REv. 1211 (2015).
75 Id atFigure 10.
76 Id. at Figure 11.
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Yet, of course, the last three justices frequently disagreed with the Court's
securities decisions. Thus, we believe various aggregate measures, while
helpful, must be used very cautiously and should be augmented by close
examination of individual justice's voting behavior and written opinions.
In this Part, we identify not only Stevens's positions in various cases,
but also seek to discern the key elements and recurring themes of Stevens's
securities law jurisprudence. As we elaborate on below, Stevens's opinions
defy categorization on some simplistic "results-oriented" or supposed ideo-
logical basis. Our analysis reveals, not unexpectedly, a justice who took
seriously his responsibility to reach his own decisions-while stating
why-and who did so by unyielding fidelity to what he considered to be the
governing legal principles.
Our analysis also reveals Justice Stevens was mindful of-and openly
lamented on occasion-the fact that his understanding of those principles
frequently differed from that of a majority of his colleagues. He believed,
however, that it was the Court, not him, that had, over the span of several
decades (1971-2010), significantly changed legal course in this area. In an
important sense, Stevens wrote "against" that movement-a movement in
large part led by Justice Powell until 1987, but continuing long after as
well-and also to preserve an alternative and, to Stevens, a superior ap-
proach to deciding securities law cases. Again, the important memory of
Justice Rutledge's enduring dissents may have loomed large in his mind. A
recent and ironic example in this regard is that the Court, in a June 2014
opinion authored by Chief Justice Roberts that refused to overturn an earlier
precedent,77 invoked-without citing Stevens-one of Stevens's mainstay
rationales for disagreeing with his colleagues in the majority: disturbing
earlier Court precedent is generally best left to Congress.
A. Early Writing in Securities
Professor Dennis Hutchinson once observed that, early on, Stevens
had "no vision and [was] not interested in playing the game."78 In the secu-
rities law area, this comment does not ring true. Stevens wrote a securities
law opinion within the first few months on the Court, even though he had
joined mid-term.79 He dissented-alone. In his first securities law opinion,
Stevens, as would prove to be characteristic, devoted several pages to histo-
ry, language, and statutory purpose as he carefully sought to reconcile the
narrow venue provision of the National Bank Act with the venue provision
of the Exchange Act, preferring the latter. By this opinion, Stevens sig-
77 Halliburton Co. v. Erica P. John Fund, Inc., 134 S. Ct. 2398, 2411-13 (2014).
78 Charles Lane, With Longevity on Court, Stevens' Center-Left Influence Has Grown, WASH.
POST, Feb. 21, 2006, at Al.
79 Radzanower v. Touche Ross & Co., 426 U.S. 148, 158 (1976) (Stevens, J., dissenting).
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naled what Justice Potter Stewart later would say about him: "[H]e's really
John Paul Jones-'I have not yet begun to write."'8 °
During the Court's next term, Stevens again dissented and wrote an
opinion-this time joined by Justice Brennan-in a major Exchange Act
case.' Drawing on the recently decided case of Cort v. Ash,82 a decision
curtailing implied private causes of action, the Court held that an unsuc-
cessful tender offer bidder had no claim against target company manage-
ment or the successful bidder under § 14(e) of the Exchange Act,83 or Rule
1 Ob-6.84 Stevens observed, however, that the unsuccessful bidder was also
a shareholder in the target company and, in that capacity, should have a
claim against the fraudster bidder."
This opinion also sent a signal, namely, that Stevens fully intended to
be an engaged jurist in the arcane world of securities law, notwithstanding
no professional background in the area. He also began staking out his view
on the remedial aspect of these laws. In his Piper dissent, Stevens took an
expansive view of remedies under the Exchange Act, a recurring hallmark
of his writing. Moreover, he made it clear to the very end of his long tenure
on the Court that he regarded Cort v. Ash, relied on in Piper, as a mistaken
decision carrying ongoing adverse consequences for the proper remedying
of securities offenses.86 Thirty-three years after Cort, Stevens wrote la-
mentingly that it was a "law-changing opinion... "87
During that same 1976 term, Stevens concurred in the important case
of Santa Fe Industries, Inc. v. Green,88 just one month after the Piper deci-
sion. The majority held that a shareholder who objected to being "squeezed
out" of his minority position pursuant to a short-form merger under Dela-
ware's corporate statute89 could not thereby bring an action under § 10(b) of
the Exchange Act or Rule 1 Ob-5.9°
Unlike Justice Brennan, who dissented in Santa Fe and who had
joined Stevens's prior dissent in Piper, Stevens concurred in an opinion
joined by Justice Blackmun.9' Stevens agreed with the majority in Santa Fe
that no deceptive or manipulative conduct--essential to a Rule 1Ob-5
claim-had been alleged and therefore he concurred in the Court's judg-
80 Lane, supra note 78, at A 1.
81 Piper v. Chris-Craft Ind., Inc., 430 U.S. 1, 53 (1977) (Stevens, J., dissenting).
82 422 U.S. 66 (1975).
83 15 U.S.C. § 78n(e) (2015).
84 17 C.F.R. § 240.1Ob-6 (1964, Supp. 1966).
85 See id. at 59.
86 Stoneridge Investment Partners, LLC v. Scientific-Atlanta, Inc., 552 U.S. 148, 178 (Stevens, J.,
dissenting).
87 id.
88 430 U.S. 462 (1977).
89 DEL. CODE ANN. § 253 (2012).
90 430 U.S. at 474.
91 Id. at480.
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ment.92 But he emphasized that he did not join in Part IV of the majority
opinion, with its very broad discussion of policy and the supposed risk of
"federalizing" state corporate law, a central and enduring portion of that
opinion. Stevens objected to that Part, he noted,93 because he thought there
was a "danger" that it would be read as extending both Piper and Blue Chip
Stamps v. Manor Drug Stores,94 two decisions that Stevens adamantly be-
lieved "were incorrectly decided."95
As in Piper, and striking a theme that would recur in his securities
opinions, Stevens's concurrence in Santa Fe displayed his twin aims of
adhering to the plain language of the Exchange Act while cautioning that
the Act should not, as a remedial matter, be read restrictively. In just his
second term on the Court, Stevens seemed to have a strong, prescient ink-
ling of where, during this important transitional era, the Court was headed
in curbing securities law remedies, a direction he would, over the years,
continually resist. His opinion in Santa Fe made it clear as well, and early
on, that it should not be assumed he would align with liberal-leaning Justice
Brennan on securities law cases. Those two justices frequently parted on
securities cases, even during Justice Powell's transformative heyday on the
Court.96 It was, after all, Justice Brennan who wrote the opinion in Cort v.
Ash,97 much disliked by Stevens as being a wrong turn that has hobbled
investor protection ever since.
B. Not Simplistically Pro-Investor
To say that Justice Stevens thought, for a variety of reasons, that the
remedial provisions of the federal securities laws should be read broadly is
not to say he reflexively favored plaintiff-investors. In the first securities
opinion Stevens wrote for the Court,9" the Court unanimously held that a
district court's determination that an action may not be maintained as a
class action pursuant to Rule 23 is not a "final decision" that is immediately
92 Id. at 480-81.
93 Id. at 481.
94 421 U.S. 723 (1975).
95 430 U.S. at 480-81.
96 As to Justice Powell's important role in altering securities law, see Pritchard, supra note 23.
Although some studies suggest, as in Powell's case with securities law, that conservative judges since
the 1960s have been inclined toward overruling what they regard as "liberal" precedents, it was recog-
nized liberal Justice Brennan who wrote the majority opinion in Copy, not Powell. See, e.g., Lori A.
Ringhand, Judicial Activism: An Empirical Examination of Voting Behavior on the Rehnquist Natural
Court, 24 CONSTITUTIONAL COMMENTARY 43 (2007); Jeffrey A. Segal & Robert M. Howard, How
Supreme Court Justices Respond to Litigant Requests to Overturn Precedents, 85 JUDICATURE 148,
156-57 (2001).
97 422 U.S. 66 (1975).
98 Coopers & Lybrand v. Livesay, 437 U.S. 463 (1978).
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appealable.9 The result was a major hurdle to the maintenance of class
actions where certification is denied, and it subsequently served to under-
score the importance of the certification stage in securities litigation."°
And Justice Stevens took what can be characterized as not only an
"anti" investor position but also a cramped, and downright puzzling, read-
ing of the Exchange Act in two important companion cases in 1985."' The
Court, with only Stevens in dissent, held in Landreth that the sale of all of
the stock in a closely held corporation involved the sale of a "security" even
if the buyers themselves intended to operate the business.°2 This holding
squelched the budding "sale of business" doctrine, whereunder a sale of
corporate stock would not be considered a "security" sale if the purchaser
actively ran the business. Under that doctrine, such a transaction was, in
substance, merely the sale of a "business" that, only in form, was dressed in
the guise of a securities transaction. The companion Gould decision, again
with only Stevens in dissent, held that the sale of 50% of the stock in a
closely held corporation likewise involved the sale of a security.°3 Both
opinions were authored by Justice Powell who, although candidly acknowl-
edging some wavering in how the Court had earlier reasoned in cases defin-
ing "securities,"'' saw common stock as the quintessential security."5
Justice Stevens dissented in both cases. He did not dispute Powell's
view of common stock as being a "security." Instead, he dissented on the
quite basic ground that the federal securities laws simply are inapplicable
unless a security is traded in a public market, or unless an investor is not in
a position to negotiate contractual protection, such as robust warranties and
representations, or is unable to insist on access to inside information. °6
Acknowledging the imprecise contours of the federal securities laws, but
once again looking to legislative history and policy for guidance, Stevens
concluded that Congress simply did not intend to regulate nonpublic securi-
ties via the federal securities laws. 7 That position was apparently uniquely
held by Stevens, it never gained traction, and of course it would altogether
99 Id.
100 Class certification in securities litigation remains important and contentious after the Supreme
Court recently refused to overrule Basic v. Levinson, 485 U.S. 224 (1988). Halliburton Co. v. Erica P.
John Fund, Inc., 134 S. Ct. 2398 (2014). See Todd Henderson & Adam Pritchard, Halliburton Will
Raise Cost Of Securities Class Actions, LAW360, (July 2, 2014), http://www.law360.com/articIes/55283
9/halliburton-will-raise-cost-of-securities-class-actions.
101 Landreth Timber Co. v. Landreth, 471 U.S. 681 (1985); Gould v. Ruefenacht, 471 U.S. 701
(1985).
102 471 U.S. 681 (1985).
103 471 U.S. 701 (1985).
104 471 U.S. at688.
105 ld. at 694.
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eliminate Rule 10b-5 litigation involving closely held companies, thereby
stripping investors of a potent legal theory.'08 Stevens' dissents in these two
cases clearly establish that he did not regard preservation of federal reme-
dies for defrauded investors to be in and of itself a sufficient touchstone by
which he would interpret the securities laws. Stevens certainly believed in
a broad reading of the remedial provisions of those laws, but only where
Congress so intended.
In addition, in 2006 Justice Stevens himself authored the "anti-
investor" decision in Merrill Lynch v. Dabit. '09 The Court there ruled that a
state law securities claim brought in federal court on diversity grounds was
preempted by the Securities Litigation Uniform Standards Act (SLUSA),
even though it was brought by an investor who "held" stock, rather than one
who bought or sold stock. Stevens, although ruling against the investor,
nonetheless took the opportunity to write that the Blue Chip Stamps deci-
sion he disliked-limiting Rule 1Ob-5 claims to "purchasers" and
"sellers"--was, properly understood, just a standing case, not one going to
the scope of the underlying action."' He cited for a properly broad reading
of the Rule's "in connection with" language the 2002 opinion for the Court
he wrote in SEC v. Zandford." Thus, although believing himself bound by
Congressional intent as expressed in SLUSA, and therefore holding against
the investor in Dabit, Stevens, in doing so, sought to preserve as best he
could the underlying breadth of Rule 1Ob-5 for use more generally. This
was consistent with his overall approach of reading the remedial provisions
of federal securities law broadly, while still being constrained by his under-
standing of Congress' intent.
C. Views on Congressional nd Judicial Roles in Making Securities Law
The most striking thread running through Justice Stevens's securities
law opinions is his steadfast position on the proper relationship between
Congress and the Court in lawmaking. It is his view on this subject, which
he believed had been steadily and dramatically altered by the Court over the
course of his tenure, that undergirded much of his most spirited writing in
this area.
An early procedural ruling in the first of three hostile takeover cases
decided by the Court provides an example, as well as revealing Stevens's
108 In Gustafson v. Alloyd, 513 U.S. 561 (1995), the Court ruled that § 12(a)(2) of the Securities
Act did not cover private resale transactions but the Court has never ruled that Rule l0b-5 does not
cover such transactions. Not surprisingly, given his views in Landreth and Gould, Stevens agreed with
the holding in Gustafson.
109 547 U.S. 71 (2006).
110 Id. at77.
" 535 U.S. 813 (2002).
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shrewd use of judicial precedent with which he had initially disagreed."2
Citing Radzanower"3 as authority-a decision he alone had dissented
from' '4-Stevens, writing for the Court, held that § 27 of the Exchange Act
did not support venue in Texas for an action brought by a tender offer bid-
der against Idaho officials for enforcing Idaho's anti-takeover statute."5
Remedially, this outcome was "anti-bidder," unlike Stevens's earlier dissent
in Piper, which would have authorized private bidder claims, and unlike his
subsequent two pro-bidder votes against state anti-takeover statutes on
Commerce Clause grounds."6 But the opinion demonstrated that Stevens
sought to give primacy in his rulings to legislative intent, with earlier prec-
edent-even that with which he disagreed-being a constraining and some-
times strategic aid to achieving that end.
Stevens turned, as he often did in his opinion writing, to legislative
history-as well as the statutory text itself-in later concurring that the
demand requirement of Civil Procedure Rule 23.1 did not apply to an action
by an investment company shareholder under § 36(b) of the Investment
Company Act alleging excessive investment advisor fees."7 Beyond noting
that Rule 23.1 did not create a derivative right-addressing as it did, only
the pleading of such a claim-Stevens extensively surveyed the legislative
history of § 36(b) and found no support for imposing a demand require-
ment. "8
This turn to history in quest of Congress' intent-and not confining
himself to a statute's or rule's text-became a Stevens trademark in numer-
ous opinions he wrote in the securities law area.' In the term immediately
after the Fox case, for example, Stevens sought, to no avail, to argue that
legislative history showed no congressional intent to regulate nonpublic
112 LeRoy v. Great Western United Corp., 443 U.S. 173 (1979).
113 See supra note 79 and accompanying text.
114 Id.
115 443 U.S. at 180-81.
116 CTS Corp. v. Dynamics Corp. of America, 481 U.S. 69 (1987) (Stevens, J., dissenting); Edgar
v. MITE Corp., 457 U.S. 624 (1982) (Stevens, J., concurring in part). It is worth noting that Stevens
and Powell agreed in Edgar v. MITE that the Illinois Act challenged there was not preempted by the
Williams Act, and Powell expressly agreed even with the key part of Stevens' phrasing on this point.
457 U.S. at 647, 655. They parted company in CTS, however.
117 Daily Income Fund, Inc. v. Fox, 464 U.S. 523 (1984).
118 Id. at 545 (Stevens, J., concurring).
119 Although a recent study suggests that liberal justices use the interpretive technique of examin-
ing legislative history more often than conservative justices, we make two observations with specific
regard to Justice Stevens in this respect. First, he paid close attention to the text of a rule or statute as
well, but where that was not conclusive, he turned to legislative history, or he did so to support the
textual reading. Second, as pointed out in supra notes 99-106 and accompanying text, Stevens looked to
history even where doing so led him to an "anti-investor" conclusion, not to reach some ex ante pre-
ferred policy outcome. See David Law & David Zaring, Law Versus Ideology: The Supreme Court and
the Use of Legislative History, 51 WM. & MARY L. REv. 1653, 1739 (2010).
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securities.'2' Adopting Stevens's view in this regard would substantially
reduce remedies for defrauded investors in nonpublic securities, but, on
principle, Stevens faithfully followed where he thought the legislative trail
led. That same term, he more successfully drew on his customary detailed
look at legislative history in writing for a unanimous Court.21  The Court
ruled that a convicted fraudster could publish a newsletter of general circu-
lation that offered no personal investment advice, because of an exclusion
under the Investment Adviser's Act that Stevens painstakingly reviewed. 
22
In several high-profile cases, Stevens's use of legal history took a dif-
ferent and significant turn. He argued, in essence, that longstanding, "set-
tled" judicial interpretations of the federal securities laws should be altered,
if at all, only by the Legislative branch, not the Judicial.23 Thus, when in
Shearson/American Express v. McMahon the Court held that § 10(b) claims
are arbitrable, Stevens, along with Justices Blackmun, Brennan, and Mar-
shall, dissented, but he wrote separately from the other dissenters. Stevens
stated that his disagreement with the majority was on the narrow but critical
basis that such a dramatic departure in how securities law disputes had long
been resolved should be undertaken by Congress, not the Court.
124
Stevens elaborated on his view of the respective roles of the Court and
Congress in lawmaking when, two years later, he dissented from the
Court's holding-and overturning of a 36-year precedent'25-that Securities
Act claims also can be arbitrated.'2 6 Stevens fully acknowledged that there
were respectable policy and textual arguments favoring the Court's recon-
ciliation of the Federal Arbitration Act and the remedial provisions of the
Securities Act.'27 But in an opinion joined this time by Justices Blackmun,
Brennan, and Marshall, Stevens first scolded the Court of Appeals for what
he called an "indefensible brand of judicial activism" in not treating Wilko
v. Swan as controlling precedent.'28 He then rebuked the Court's majority
for not leaving intact a judicial interpretation of an act of Congress that had
been settled for many years.'29 Given that for several decades Congress
itself had not acted to legislatively change that interpretation, the Court,
120 See supra notes 101-05 and accompanying text.
121 Lowev. S.E.C., 472 U.S. 181 (1985).
122 id.
123 See, e.g., Shearson/American Express, Inc. v. McMahon, 482 U.S. 220 (1987) (Stevens, J.,
concurring in part and dissenting in part).
124 id.
125 Wilko v. Swan, 346 U.S. 427 (1953), overruled by Rodriguez de Quijas v. Shearson/American
Express, Inc., 490 U.S. 477 (1989).
126 Rodriguez de Quijas v. Shearson/American Express, Inc., 490 U.S. 477 (1989) (Stevens, J.,
dissenting).
127 Id. at 487.
128 Id. at 486.
129 Id. at 487.
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Stevens argued, should respect that quiescence as the settled and authorita-
tive "work product" of Congress.'3
Interestingly, in June 2014, the Supreme Court refused to overrule a
key securities law decision from 16 years earlier that one party, joined by
many amici, contended had been wrongly decided.3' In declining to do so,
Chief Justice Roberts, writing for the Court, responded that doing so re-
quired "special justification"-absent at bar, he declared-because it was
for Congress to decide whether the Court had gotten it wrong. 132 Although
Stevens's writings were not cited, the reasoning of this 2014 decision was
quite similar to that employed by Justice Stevens in his dissent 25 years
earlier.
Repeatedly, Stevens anchored his securities opinions on this approach
to judging as he witnessed the Court's dramatic transformation of the secu-
rities law landscape during the 1980s and 1990s. Concurring in Reves v.
Ernst & Young,'33 that promissory notes are not per se "securities" under the
Exchange Act, Stevens emphasized that the "settled construction" given to
the definition of "note" by the SEC and Courts of Appeal should not be
disturbed unless Congress so decides.'34 He later repeated this philosophy
in dissenting from the Court's abrupt change to the longstanding Rule 1 Ob-
5 statute of limitation.'35 But here, Stevens added a new dimension that
better grounded his conviction that the Court was rapidly re-writing federal
securities law all by itself.
In dissenting from the Court's adoption of a uniform federal statute of
limitations period for 1Ob-5 claims, Stevens noted that because the Court
had long borrowed limitations periods from the forum state, it was for Con-
gress, not the Court, to decide whether to alter that settled principle.'36
Moreover, seeking to resist what he saw as the continued whittling-back of
Rule 1 Ob-5 as a robust remedy, Stevens offered a new interpretation of the
implied private remedy under this Rule.'37 He argued that the first district
court opinion recognizing an implied private cause of action under Rule
lOb-5 in 1946 was not really "new law."'38 This is because, Stevens assert-
ed, in 1946, as in the early 1930s when the federal securities laws were en-
acted, it was a "well-settled rule" of federal law to imply a private claim
when a violation of a statute causes damage to one for whose benefit the
130 Id. at 486.
131 Halliburton Co. v. Erica P. John Fund, Inc., 134 S. Ct. 2398, 2407 (2014).
132 Id. at 2407, 2413.
133 494 U.S. 56 (1990).
134 494 U.S. at 74 (Stevens, J., concurring).
135 Lampfv. Gilbertson, 501 U.S. 350, 366 (1991) (Stevens, J., dissenting).
136 Again, this is exactly the reasoning of the Court in refusing in 2014 to overrule an earlier prece-
dent. See supra notes 131-32 and accompanying text.
137 501 U.S. at 366-69 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
138 Id. at 366-67 (citing Kardon v. Nat ' Gypsum Co., 69 F. Supp. 512 (E.D. Pa. 1946)).
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statute was adopted.'39 In short, he contended that the Court's majority, in
overturning precedent in the 1980s and 1990s, was single-handedly re-
vamping securities law jurisprudence, quite apart from Congress, the proper
body for doing so.
When the Supreme Court three years later eliminated a private claim
for aiding and abetting a Rule lOb-5 violation,4 ° Stevens again dissented
on the basis that the Court was wrongly disturbing a settled construction of
the Exchange Act that only Congress should, if at all, modify.'4' He be-
lieved that the eleven Circuit Courts that had long recognized private claims
for aiding and abetting were closer to the legal climate of the 1930s when
these landmark laws had been enacted.'42 As such, their interpretation
should prevail, subject only to congressional action."' Citing his concur-
rence in Reves, and noticeably upping the fervor of his judicial distress,
Stevens also cautioned the Court not to "lop off rights" that had been "rec-
ognized for decades."'"
Stevens's position that Congress, not the Supreme Court, rightly had
the chief role in designing federal securities law was evident again when he
dissented the following year from a decision striking down an act of Con-
gress on separation of powers grounds.'45 After Lampf had abruptly short-
ened the statute of limitations for Rule lOb-5 claims,'46 many such pending
claims were dismissed as untimely.'47 Congress quickly enacted a new pro-
vision-§ 27A(b) of the Exchange Act-that reinstated any such claim
dismissed as untimely due to Lampf45 Stevens strenuously argued that
Congress was acting within its proper constitutional sphere in providing a
limitations rule for those Rule lOb-5 actions pending prior to Lampf'49 He
wrote at length as to why Justice Scalia, writing for the majority, had badly
misread the Supreme Court precedent that had fully respected Congress's
later treatment of final judgments so as to serve remedial purposes.50
Stevens's belief in preserving a robust private remedies approach to
securities regulation,, as designed by Congress,, is seen as well in his dis-
sent in Virginia Bankshares, Inc. v. Sandberg,5' an important 1991 Ex-
139 Id. at 366.
140 Cent. Bank of Denver, N.A. v. First Interstate Bank of Denver, N.A., 511 U.S. 164 (1994).
141 511 U.S. at 192-201 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
142 Id. at 193.
143 Id. at 198.
144 511 U.S. at 201.
145 Plaut v. Spendthrift Farm, Inc., 514 U.S. 211 (1995).
146 Lampfv. Gilbertson, 501 U.S. 350, 364 (1991).
147 Lyman Johnson, Securities Fraud and the Mirage of Repose, 1992 Wis. L. REv. 607, 612
(1992).
148 Seeid. at 610-11 n.6.
149 Plaut, 514 U.S. at 261.
150 Id. at260-65.
151 501 U.S. 1083 (1991).
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change Act decision distinguished by the Court in the context of § 11 of the
Securities Act during its October 2014 term.52 In the § 1 1 context, the
Court held that if a registration statement omits material facts about the
issuer's inquiry into or knowledge concerning a statement of opinion, and
those facts conflict with what a reasonable investor would understand, then
the omission creates liability. 53 In Virginia Bankshares, Stevens had disa-
greed with the majority's view that no causation could be shown in a Rule
14a-9 claim under the Exchange Act where the wrongdoer controlled
enough stock to solely determine the outcome of a shareholder vote.54 Ste-
vens, noting that the jury in the case had found the merger at issue to be
unfair, believed that whether or not a proxy solicitation was required by law
or by a company's bylaws was irrelevant because, when corporate man-
agement does in fact solicit proxies, an action lies under Rule 14a-9 for
making false or misleading statements.'55 The 2015 Omnicare decision
preserved a remedy for investors with respect to opinion statements with
material omissions, precisely the remedy-preserving outcome Stevens long
advocated.
In two of his last securities opinions, Stevens's lament at the Court's
altered treatment of private claims under Rule 1Ob-5 was even more pro-
nounced. In the 2008 decision of Stoneridge Investment Partners, LLC v.
Scientific-Atlanta, Inc.,56 Stevens dissented from the Court's ruling on the
"reliance" element under Rule 10b-5." He repeated his criticism of the
1994 Central Bank decision,'58 describing it as "a precedent for judicial
policymaking decisions in this area of law."'59 And he derided "the Court's
continuing campaign to render the cause of action under § 10(b) tooth-
less,"' along with its "mistaken hostility to the private cause of action."''
He again grounded this position on his reasoning in Lampf, that during the
era when the federal securities laws had been enacted, it was judicial prac-
tice to imply private claims; thus, Congress had authorized a private claim
under Rule lob-5 that the Court had wrongly curtailed.62 Stevens's disa-
greement with the Court went, quite fundamentally, to the question of
which branch of the federal government--Congress or the Court-should
be making these kinds of changes.
152 See, e.g., Omnicare, Inc. v. Laborers Dist. Council Constr. Indus. Pension Fund, 135 S. Ct.
1318 (2015).
153 Id.
154 501 U.S. at 1110 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
155 id. at 1112.
156 552 U.S. 148 (2008).
157 552 U.S. at 167 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
158 Cent. Bank of Denver, N.A. v. First Interstate Bank of Denver, N.A., 511 U.S. 164 (1994).
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Stevens reiterated this strongly held position in his final securities
opinion.'63 He concurred in the Court's holding that Rule lOb-5 did not
apply to foreign plaintiffs suing foreign and U.S. defendants for misconduct
occurring on foreign stock exchanges." He agreed too that the majority's
"transactional test" was plausible, but he stressed that the Court should not
abandon its prior approaches to jurisdiction.'65 In a summing up of his dis-
tress at the long, confining arc of the Court's jurisprudential turn in the Rule
1 Ob-5 area, Stevens stated that while he agreed with the result in the Morri-
son case, he "dissents" yet again from the Court's "continuing campaign to
render the private cause of action under § 10(b) toothless."'66 Here Stevens,
although concurring in the result, nonetheless manages to register in his last
securities opinion a strong "dissent" on the larger, years-long trajectory of
case outcomes.
D. Summary
Justice Stevens wrote a large number of securities law opinions. But
he wrote a large number of opinions of many sorts. As noted earlier,'67 he
believed that he had a duty to write. At the same time, it should be remem-
bered that he frequently did not write in many cases, including in some
high-profile securities law cases. These include United States v.
0 'Hagan,'68 Dirks v. S.E.C. 169 Basic Inc. v. Levinson,' TSC Industries, Inc.
v. Northway, Inc., ' and CTS Corp. v. Dynamics Corp. of America.'72
Where he thought a colleague's opinion for the Court adequately captured
his views, he saw no reason to write unnecessarily. And while he refrained
from writing a dissent in only three cases where he dissented from the out-
come, when he thought another justice sufficiently captured his dissenting
views, he also did not write-as was the case in CTS-where he joined in
Justice White's Commerce Clause analysis.'73 And although he frequently
concurred in the Court's securities law decisions but nonetheless wrote-
more so than any other justice in history-in all of the high-profile cases
above where he thought the majority got it right, he saw no need to state his
163 Morrison v. National Australia Bank Ltd., 561 U.S. 247, 274 (2010) (Stevens, J., concurring).
164 Id. at280.
165 Id. at 269-70.
166 Id. at 286 (citing his dissent in Stoneridge).
167 See supra note 44 and accompanying text.
168 521 U.S. 642 (1997).
169 463 U.S. 646 (1983).
170 485 U.S. 224 (1988).
171 426 U.S. 438 (1976).
172 481 U.S. 69 (1987).
173 481 U.S. at 99-102.
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views. Thus, Stevens did not write securities law opinions just to write. He
wrote when he believed one or more essential points were not being made.
Beyond the substantial numerical contribution made by Stevens to the
Supreme Court's body of securities law opinions, this Part has described the
key elements of his thinking in this area. At the risk of oversimplifying,
two themes stand out. First, Stevens believed that over the course of his
lengthy service on the Court, the Court had significantly encroached into
what should have remained the legislative domain of Congress. Second,
Stevens believed that the federal securities laws, including particularly,
§ 10(b) of the Exchange Act and Rule 1 Ob-5, were intended by Congress to
provide robust private remedies for investors in public companies, but that
the Court had sharply and wrongly curtailed these avenues for private relief.
Stevens himself, in reflecting on his career, did not consider himself to
be an activist on the Court;74 rather, he believed himself to be a "judicial
conservative."'' Given the transformation he witnessed (and resisted) in
securities laws over the period of his service,'76 in his mind, he sought to
"conserve" the state of law as it had been'--or at least leave it to Congress
to alter it, not the Court.
Although Chief Justice Roberts is generally considered to be a more
conservative justice than Stevens, he too seeks to "conserve" an existing
legal environment.' Importantly, however, the securities law environment
that Roberts wishes to conserve is the one Stevens sternly resisted, in favor
of conserving the securities law world prior to the early and mid-1970s.
Many justices, notably Powell and Rehnquist but others also, who are re-
garded as conservative in judicial philosophy,"' were key actors in effectu-
ating the very changes Justice Stevens bemoaned and Chief Justice Roberts
seeks now to conserve. As observed by Professor John Coates in his recent
study on securities law decisions by the Roberts Court, we are "likely not to
see . . . wholesale reversals of existing doctrines, . . ." ' The Roberts Court
jurisprudence in this area, overall, "does not mark a significant departure
from prior Supreme Courts."'' The judicial activism of an earlier era is
now the conservatism of a later one.
174 Rosen, supra note 24 at 52.
175 Id.
176 Pritchard, supra note 23.
177 In assessing the first few years of securities law decisions of the Court under Chief Justice
Roberts, Professor Adam Pritchard found a preference for conserving the legal status quo as well.
Adam C. Pritchard, Securities Law in the Roberts Court: Agenda or Indifference?, 37 J. CoRP. L. 105
(2011).
178 See supra notes 131-32 and accompanying text. See John C. Coates IV, Securities Litigation in
the Roberts Court: An Early Assessment, 57 ARIZ. L. REv. 1, 3 (securities cases decided under the
Roberts court "are generally preservative and modest in their effects..
179 See Fedderke & Ventoruzzo, supra note 71, at 39-40.
180 See Coates, supra note 178, at 34 (emphasis in original).
181 Id.
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CONCLUSION
Justice Stevens was, in general, a prolific writer of opinions, a fact
widely recognized. But, more specifically, he was the most prolific writer
of securities law opinions in the history of the Supreme Court, a fact no-
where recognized. He wrote more total securities opinions, more concur-
ring opinions, and more dissenting opinions than any other justice. Using
various measures, we offer a novel quantitative analysis of his opinion pro-
duction. However, we also offer a qualitative assessment of his securities
writings. We do so because he wrote during the transformative era of the
late twentieth century, and to paint an accurate portrait of Justice Stevens
one must take-as he did-a historical view of legal change.
Justice Stevens wrote not just to explain but to remember. He sought
to preserve for the corpus of Supreme Court securities law a view of that
law-and the Court's proper role in fashioning it-that Stevens thought had
been, wrongly, abandoned. As a jurist who once cited in his opinion for the
Court a dissent from 56 years before,182 Justice Stevens took the long view
of legal shifts. Securities law changed dramatically during his tenure on the
Court. His opinions, as a historical matter, chronicle many particulars of
that change, but they also set forth, as a jurisprudential matter, an approach
to lawmaking that should be remembered.
182 See supra notes 33-35 and accompanying text.
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